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We seem, or so it seems to some theorists, to experience a rich stream 
of highly detailed information concerning an extensive part of our 
current visual surroundings. But this appearance, it has been 
suggested, is in some way illusory. Our brains do not command richly 
detailed internal models of the current scene. Our seeings, it seems, 
are not all that they seem. This, then, is the Grand Illusion. We think 
we see much more than we actually do. In this paper I shall (briefly) 
rehearse the empirical evidence for this rather startling claim, and 
then critically examine a variety of responses. One especially 
interesting response is a development of the so-called ‘skill theory’, 
according to which there is no illusion after all. Instead, so the theory 
goes, we establish the required visual contact with our world by an 
ongoing process of active exploration, in which the world acts as a 
kind of reliable, interrogable, external memory (Noe, Pessoa and 
Thompson (2000), Noe (2001). The most fully worked-out versions of 
this response ( Noe and O’Regan (2000), O’Regan and Noe 2001) tend, 
however, to tie the contents of conscious visual experience rather too 
tightly to quite low-level features of this ongoing sensorimotor 
engagement. This (I shall argue) undervalues the crucial links 
between perceptual experience, reason and intentional action, and 
opens the door to a problem that I will call ‘sensorimotor chauvinism’: 
the premature welding of experiential contents to very specific details 
of our embodiment and sensory apparatus. Drawing on the dual 
visual systems hypothesis of Milner and Goodale (1995), I sketch an 
alternative version of the skill theory, in which the relation between 
conscious visual experience and the low-level details of sensorimotor 
engagement is indirect and non-constitutive. The hope is thus to 
embrace the genuine insights of the skill theory response, while 
depicting conscious visual experience as most tightly geared to 






I. Amazing Card Tricks. 
 
There is an entertaining web sitei where you can try out the following 
trick. You are shown, on screen, a display of six playing cards (new 
ones are generated each time the trick is run). In the time-honoured 
tradition, you are then asked to mentally select and recall one of those 
cards. You click on an icon and the cards disappear, to be replaced by 
a brief ‘distracter’ display. Click again and a five card (one less) array 
appears. As if by magic, the very card that you picked is the one that 
has been removed. How can it be? Could the computer have 
somehow monitored your eye movements? 
 
I confess that on first showing (and second, and third) I was quite 
unable to see how the trick was turned. It works equally well, to my 
surprise, using OHP’s or a printout! 
 
Here’s the secret. The original array will always comprise six cards of 
a similar broad type e.g. six face cards, or six assorted low-ranking 
cards (between about 2 and 6) etc. When the new, 5 card array 
appears, NONE of these cards will be in the set. But the new 5 card 
array will be of the same type e.g. face cards, low cards, whatever. In 
this way, the trick capitalises on the visual brain’s laziness (or 
efficiency, if you prefer). It seems to the subject exactly as if all that 
has happened is that one card (the one they mentally selected!) has 
gone from an otherwise unchanged array. But the impression that the 
original array is still present is a mistake, rooted no doubt in the fact 
that all we had actually encoded was something like ‘lots of royal 
cards including my mentally selected king of hearts’ii  
 
Most magic tricks rely on our tendency to overestimate what we 
actually see in a single glance, and on the manipulation of attention so 
as to actively inhibit the extraction of crucial information at certain 




Daniel Dennett makes a similar point using a different card trick. He 
invites someone to stand in front of him, and to fixate his (Dennett’s) 
nose. In each outstretched arm Dennett holds a playing card. He 
brings his arms in steadily. The question is, at what point will the 
subject be able to identify the colour of the card? Here too, we may be 
surprised. For colour sensitivity, it turns out, is available only in a 
small and quite central part of the visual field. Yet my conscious 
experience, clearly, is not as of a small central pool of colour 
surrounded by a vague and out of focus expanse of halftones. Things 
look coloured all the way out. Once again, it begins to look as if my 
conscious visual experience is overestimating the amount and quality 
of information it makes available. Talk of a Grand Illusioniii is clearly 
on the cards. 
 
II. Seeing, Seeming and The Space for Error 
 
 
How should we characterise the kind of visual overestimation 
highlighted by the card tricks (and by the experimental evidence to be 
examined in the next section)? The matter is delicate. We cannot, 
surely, make much sense of the idea that we are wrong about how our 
visual experience visually seems. If it seems to me as if I see colours ‘all 
the way out’ then that simply is how it seems to me: there is little 
space for error in this space of seemings. 
 
About what, then, might I actually be mistaken? Not about the visual 
seeming itself. And not, of course, about the actual real-world scene. 
That scene, in the typical case, really is coloured all the way out, and 
really is rich in detail etc. The space for genuine error is thus rather 
small. It must centre on what we come to believe as a result of how our 
visual experience presents the world to us. Perhaps, for example, we 
come to believe that our brains are constructing, moment-by-moment, 
a richly detailed, constantly updated internal representation of the 
full, and fully coloured, visual scene. Noe, Pessoa and Thompson 
(2000) term this the ‘reconstructionist’ model of vision. The idea of a 
rich visual buffer (Feldman 1985), in which more and more 




On both these counts, science could easily show us to be wrong. But 
(As Noe et al point out) our error would be a technical one: an error in 
the theory that our experience leads us (some of us) to construct. This 
sounds rather less grand than the claim that we are simply mistaken 
about the nature of our own visual experience, or subject to some kind 
of experiential illusion. 
 
It is possible, even more radically, to be sceptical about the very idea 
of a ‘way things visually seem to us’, at least insofar as such seemings 
are depicted as objects of conscious awareness. In this vein Mark 
Rowlands (ms) suggests that “what it is like to undergo an experience 
is not something of which we are aware but something with which we 
are aware in the having of an experience”. Visual seemings, he 
suggests, are not objects of normal visual experience, so much as 
modes of experiencing the world. As such, they do not seem any way 
at all: instead, via the experiences, the world seems this way or that. 
 
There is good reason, then, to be a little cautious of statements such as 
the following: 
 
The visual world seems to naïve reflection to be uniformly 
detailed and focussed from the centre out to the boundaries, 
but…this is not so. 
Dennett 1991 p.53 
 
Much depends, of course, on just what gets built into the idea of 
‘naïve reflection’ (how naïve, and by whom?). At the very least it 
looks likely that the path to Grand Illusion is paved by inferences: 
inferences that concern the internal machinery of seeing and take us 
far beyond the simple act of visually knowing the world. 
 
But surely, someone will reply, there is also an illusion within the 
domain of the experience itself. It does not seem to us as if our colour 
vision is as restricted as it is. So there is error in the way things 
visually seem. Rowlands would reject this, for the reasons just 
examined. But in any case, the response assumes, illegitimately, that 
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whatever is true of our experience must be true of the underlying 
machinery, and at a kind of instantaneous time-slice at that. Perhaps 
there need be no such match. Or if there is a match, it may be between 
visual activity over time and the contents of the experience. 
 
The space for genuine error, I conclude, is not as large as it may 
initially appear. The kernel of truth in the sweeping talk of a Grand 
Illusion must be sought in a careful analysis of certain theoretical 
commitments. With that in mind, let’s start by taking a look at the 





III. What Goes Unnoticediv 
 
It is well known that the human visual system supports only a small 
area of high-resolution processing; an area corresponding to the 
fraction of the visual field which is currently foveated. When we 
inspect a visual scene, our brains actively move this small high-
resolution window around the scene, alighting first on one location, 
then another.  The whole of my bookcase, for example, cannot 
possibly fit into this high-resolution window at a glance, at least while 
I remain seated at my desk.  My overall visual field (including the 
low-resolution peripheries) is, of course, much larger, and a sizeable 
chunk of my bookshelf falls within my course-grained view.  As long 
ago as 1967v it was known that the brain makes intelligent use of the 
small high-resolution area, moving it around the scene (in a sequence 
of so-called “visual saccades”) in ways suited to the specific problem 
at hand.  Human subjects confronted with identical pictures, but 
preparing to solve different kinds of problem (e.g. “give the sex and 
ages of the people in the picture,” “describe what is going on” and so 
on) show very different patterns of visual saccade.  These saccades, it 
is also worth commenting, are fast – perhaps three per second – and 
often repetitive, in that they may visit and re-visit the very same part 




One possibility, at this point, was that each saccade is being used to 
slowly build-up a detailed internal representation of the salient aspects 
of the scene.  The visual system would thus be selective, but would 
still be using input to build up an increasingly detailed neural image 
of (selected aspects of) the scene.  Subsequent research, however, 
suggests that the real story is even stranger than that. 
 
Imagine that you are the subject of this famous experiment.vi  You are 
sat in front of a computer screen on which is displayed a page of text.  
Your eye movements are being automatically tracked and monitored.  
Your experience, as you report it, is of a solid, stable page of text 
which you can read in the usual way.  The experimenter then reveals 
the trick.  In fact, the text to the left and right of a moving ‘window’ 
has been constantly filled with junk characters, not proper English text 
at all.  But because the small window of normal, sensible text has been 
marching in step with your central perceptual span, you never noticed 
anything odd or unusual.  It is as if my bookshelf only contained (at 
any one moment) four or five proper, clearly titled books, and the rest 
was fuzzy, senseless junk.  But those four or five proper items were 
moved about as my eyes saccaded around the scene!  In the case of the 
screen of text, the window of “good stuff” needed to support the 
illusion is about 18 characters wide, with the bulk of those falling to 
the right of the point of fixation (because English is read left to right). 
 
Similar experimentsvii have been performed using pictures of a visual 
scene, such as a house, with a parked car and a garden.  As before, the 
subject sits in front of a computer generated display.  Her eye 
movements are monitored and, while she saccades around the 
display, changes are clandestinely made: the colours of flowers and 
cars are altered, the structure of the house may be changed. Such 
changes, likewise, go undetected.  We now begin to understand why 
the patterns of saccade are not cumulative – why we visit and 
repeatedly re-visit the same locations.  It is because our brains just 
don’t bother to create even the kind of selective-but rich inner models 
we earlier considered.  Why should they?  The world itself is still 
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there, a complex and perfect store of all that data, nicely poised for 
swift retrieval as and when needed by the simple expedient of visual 
saccade to a selected location.  The kind of knowledge that counts, it 
begins to seem, is not detailed knowledge of what’s out there, so 
much as a broad idea of what’s out there: one capable of informing 
those on-the-spot processes of information retrieval and use.   
 
Finally, lest we suspect that these effects (known as “change 
blindness”) are somehow caused by the unnaturalness of the 
experimental situation, consider some recent work by Dan Simons 
and Dan Levin. Simons and Levin (1997) took the research into the 
real world.  They set up a king of slapstick scenario in which an 
experimenter would pretend to be lost on the Cornell Campus, and 
would approach an unsuspecting passer-by to ask for directions.  
Once the passer-by started to reply, two people carrying a large door 
would (rudely!) walk right between the enquirer and the passer-by.  
During the walk through, however, the original enquirer is replaced 
by a different person.  Only 50% of the direction-givers noticed the 
change.  Yet the two experimenters were of different heights, wore 
different clothes, had very different voices and so on.  Moreover, 
those who did notice the change were students of roughly the same 
age and demographics as the two experimenters.  In a follow-up 
study, the students failed to spot the change when the experimenters 
appeared as construction workers, placing them in a different social 
group.  The conclusion that Simons and Levin (1997, p.266) draw is 
that our failures to detect change arise because “we lack a precise 
representation of our usual world from one view to the next”. We 
encode only a kind of ‘rough gist’ of the current scene – just enough to 
support a broad sense of what’s going on insofar as it matters to us, and 
to guide further intelligent information-retrieval as and when needed.  
 
In all these cases, the unnoticed changes are made under cover of 
some distracting event: they are made during a saccade, a screen 
flicker, a movie cut and so on. These mask the visual transients 
(motion cues) that might otherwise draw attention to the fact that 




The importance of attention is underlined by a different series of 
experiments due to Mack and Rock (1998). These concern what they 
call ‘inattentional blindness’. The focus here is not on change over 
time, so much as upon what can be noticed in a static scene (for an 
excellent discussion of this at times elusive distinction, see Rensink 
(2000)). The question guiding the experiments was thus simply “What 
is consciously perceived in the absence of visual attention?” and more 
particularly “Will an object, unexpectedly presented in the visual 
field, tend to be consciously noticed?”  
 
A typical experiment went like this. Subjects were shown a visually 
presented cross (on a computer screen) and asked to report which arm 
of the cross was longer. The difference was small, so the task required 
some attention and effort. The cross was briefly presented (for about 
200ms) and then a mask (an unrelated, patterned stimulus) shown. 
Then the subjects made their reports. On the third or fourth trial, 
however, a ‘critical stimulus’ was also shown on the screen with the 
cross. It might be a coloured square, a moving bar, and so on. Subjects 
were not expecting this. The question was, would it be consciously 
noticed? 
 
The experiment was run in two main forms. In the first, the cross was 
presented centrally, at the point of fixation, and the critical stimulus 
parafoveally (to the side). In the second, subjects fixated a central 
point, the cross was presented parafoveally and the critical stimulus 
appeared just beside the fixation point. With the critical stimulus 
presented parafoveally, 25% of subjects failed to spot it. This is 
already a surprising result. But when presented near fixation, a full 
75% of subjects failed to report the stimulus! Why the difference? 
Perhaps the need to focus visual attention away from the normal 
central point demanded increased visual effort and attention. Also, 
subjects may have had to actively inhibit information from the point 
of fixation. Interestingly, in both cases, subjects did spot more 
meaningful stimuli, such as their own names, or a smiley face: a quirk 




Our unconscious and inattentive use of visual input may, in addition, 
be surprisingly extensive. For example, other words which were used 
as the critical stimulus in some of Mack and Rock’s experiments, 
though unnoticed, were capable of priming subsequent choices. 
Exposure to the word ‘provide’ increases the likelihood of the stem 
completion ‘pro’ with ‘vide’, despite the subjects total lack of 
conscious awareness of the initial stimulus.  
 
From all of this, Mack and Rock draw a strong and unambiguous 
conclusion. There is, they claim “no conscious perception at all in the 
absence of attention” (op cit. p.227). This would be trivial if attention 
itself were defined in terms of, say, our conscious awareness of an 
object. But what Mack and Rock really mean is that there is no 
conscious perception in the absence of expectations and intentions 
directed at an object. They offer no clear definition of attention itself. 
But inattention is quite well characterised: 
 
For a subject to qualify as inattentive to a particular visual 
stimulus, the subject must be looking in the general area in 
which it appears, but must have no expectation that it will 
appear nor any intention regarding it. 
Mack and Rock (1998) p.243 
 
 
The importance of attention and expectation is nowhere more 
apparent than in another famous experimentviii in which subjects 
watch a video of two teams, one in white and one in black, passing 
basketballs (one ball per team). The viewer must count the number of 
successful passes made by the white team. Afterwards, subjects are 
asked whether they saw anything else, anything unusual. In fact, 
about 45 seconds into the film an intruder walks through the players. 
The intruder might be a semi-transparent, ghostly figure of a woman 
holding an umbrella, or a semi-transparent gorilla (without any 
umbrella). Or even, on some trials, a fully opaque woman or gorilla! 
In the semi-transparent condition, 73 % of subjects failed to see the 
gorilla, and even in the opaque condition, 35% of subjects failed to 




Simons interprets these results as suggesting the possibility: 
 
That our intuitions about attentional capture reflect a 
metacognitive error: we do not realise the degree to which we are 
blind to unattended and unexpected stimuli and we mistakenly 
believe that important events will automatically draw our 
attention away from our current task or goals. 
Simons (2000) p.154  My emphasis. 
 
 
It is easy to see, given the work on change blindness and inattentional 
blindness, why talk of a Grand Illusion can seem so compelling. 




There are, as far as I know, four main responses to the bodies of data 
reviewed in section 2. They are: 
 
i. The Grand Illusion 
ii. Fleeting Awareness with Rapid Forgetting 
iii.Projected (memory-based) Richness 
iv.Skill Theory 
 
Hints of the Grand Illusion response can be seen in many treatments 
from Dennett 1991 onwards, including Ballard (1991), O’Regan (1992) 
Churchland et al (1994), Clark (1997) and Simons and Levin (1997). 
The idea is simple and attractive. We do indeed (it is claimed) seem to 
experience a continuous stream of richly detailed, wide-angled, fully 
coloured, new-input-sensitive information in the conscious visual 
modality. But the seeming is just that: a seeming. It is an illusion 
caused by our ability to visually visit and re-visit different aspects of 
the scene according to our projects and as ‘captured’ (sometimes) by 
motion transients etc. We thus think that our at-a-glance visual uptake 
is much richer than it is due to our active capacity to get more 




The feeling of the presence and extreme richness of the visual 
world is…a kind of illusion, created by the immediate 
availability of the information in (an) external store [the real 
world] 
O’Regan (1992) p.461 
 
The experiential nature of the visual scene is a kind of 
subjective visual illusion created by the use of rapid scanning 
and a small window of resolution and attention. 
Clark (1997) p.31 
 
The visual system provides the illusion of three-dimensional 
stability by virtue of being able to execute fast behaviours. 
Ballard (1991) p.60 
 
The real, non-illusory, knowledge built up by our ongoing visual 
contact with a scene is, on these models, quite schematic and high-
level. We maintain a general sense of the situation, just enough to 
guide attention and saccades while we actively engage in a scene-
related task. 
 
An alternative hypothesis is the so-called “fleeting awareness” 
account (also known as “inattentional amnesia”) presented by Wolfe 
(1999). The suggestion is that our moment-by-moment conscious 
visual experience may be rich and detailed indeed, but that we simply 
forget, pretty well immediately, what the details were, unless they 
impact our plans and projects very directly. Since these paradigms 
always involve questioning at least fractionally after the event, 
subjects say they did not see the new objects etc. But this reflects a 
failure of memory rather than a deficit in ongoing conscious visual 
experience. 
 
Some element of forgetting may, I accept, be involved in some of 
these cases. But overall, the hypothesis strikes me as unconvincing. 
First of all, it is not really clear whether ‘seeing-with-immediate-
forgetting’ is really any different from not seeing at all. (Recall 
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Dennett’s 1991 discussion of Stalinesque versus Orwellian accounts). 
Second, we know that only a very small window of the visual field 
can afford high resolution input (Ballard 1991), and we know that 
attentional mechanisms probably limit our capacity to about 44 bits 
(plus or minus 15) per-glimpse (see Verghese and Pelli (1992), 
Churchland et al (1994). So how does all that fleeting richness get 
transduced? And lastly, as Simons (2000) nicely points out, the 
inattentional amnesia account seems especially improbable when the 
stimulus was an opaque gorilla presented for up to 9 seconds. Could 
we really have been consciously aware of that and then had it slip 
our minds? 
 
A third diagnosis invokes memory in a more active role: in the role of 
‘filling in’ the missing detail. The suggestion is that our conscious 
visual experience is enriched ‘top down’ by stored memories and 
expectations. So we do indeed see a highly detailed scene. It is just 
that, in a sense, we make most of it up! I suspect that this suggestion 
contains an important kernel of truth, and we shall return to it in 
section VI, where we display strong links between conscious 
experience and certain kinds of memory system. 
 
By far the most interesting, deep and challenging response, however, 
is one which rejects the Grand Illusion diagnosis while nonetheless 
accepting the poverty of the moment-by-moment internal 
representations that the visual system creates and maintains. 
According to this response, the Grand Illusion is itself a chimera, 
caused by the fall-out from a classical, disembodied approach to 
perception. If we were to really embrace the idea of cognition as the 
active engagement of organism and world, the suggestion goes, we 
would see that there is no Grand Illusion after all. Hints of this idea 
were present, right alongside the Grand Illusion diagnosis, in 
O’Regan (1992), drawing on MacKay (1967). But the most clear-cut, 
powerful and persuasive versions are those of Noe, Pessoa and 
Thompson (2000), Noe (2001), Noe and O’Regan (2000), and O’Regan 




Before proceeding, I must enter a caveat. Noe, Pessoa and  Thompson 
(2000) argue, convincingly I believe, that the Grand Illusion diagnosis 
is a mistake, and that it is a mistake caused by failing to appreciate 
that seeing is a temporally extended process involving active 
exploration of the environment. My critical concern, in what follows, 
is not with this general claim but with the specific way it is unpacked, 
in the context of a more fully worked-out version of the skill-theory, 
in O’Regan and Noe (2001). For this specific version of the skill-theory 
(I shall argue) ties conscious visual experience too closely to the full 
gamut of (what one might question-beggingly describe as) the 
‘implementation detail’ of the visual apparatus. My goeal will be to 
develop an account in the spirit both of skill-theory and of Noe, 
Pessoa and Thompson’s critique of the Grand Illusion claim. But it 
will be an account that leaves room for some details of the visual 
apparatus to make no difference to the contents or character of 
conscious visual experience. 
 
A good place to start is with the MacKay-based example given by 
O’Regan (1992) (and mentioned in O’Regan and Noe (In Press-2001)). 
The reader is invited to consider the tactile experience of holding a 
bottle in the hand. As you hold the bottle, your fingertips are in touch 
with just a few small parts of the surface. Yet what you experience is 
having the whole bottle in your grasp. This, it is argued, is because: 
 
 
My tactile perception of the bottle is provided by my 
exploration of it with my fingers, that is, by the sequence of 
changes in sensation that are provoked by this exploration and 
by the relation between the changes that occur and my 
knowledge of what bottles are like…I expect that if I move my 
hand up…I will encounter the cap or cork.. 
O’Regan (1992) p.471, following MacKay (1967) 
 
 
Our conscious tactile experience as of holding a whole bottle is thus 
generated by our implicit (not conscious, propositional) knowledge of 
how those more local finger-tip sensations would flow and alter were 
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we to actively explore the surface. The conscious perceptual content is 
thus based on actual and potential action cycles rather than on the 
instantaneously transduced information. This kind of implicit 
knowledge of reliable flows of sensory input during the execution of 
movements and actions is what O’Regan and Noe (In Press-2001) dub 
“mastery of laws of sensorimotor contingency”. 
 
Consider next the case of conscious seeing. In some ways, this is an 
even better case for the sensorimotor contingency model, since here 
we combine the input from the high resolution moveable fovea with 
low resolution peripheral signals capable of further aiding intelligent 
exploration. Our visual awareness of the scene before is thus 
grounded in a potent combination of: 
 
i. Our implicit knowledge of how the foveated input will change 
as we actively explore the scene 
ii. The ongoing sequence of cues provided by peripheral pick-up 
iii. Quite high-level knowledge of the nature of the scene or event 
we are witnessing. 
 
Taking all these into account, it does indeed seem churlish to describe 
our ongoing visual experience as misleading. The impression we have 
of rich and available detail is correct, as long as we avoid a kind of 
temporal error. The Grand Illusion diagnosis trades, perhaps 
illegitimately, upon the idea that the content of conscious visual 
perceiving is given by some instantaneous, fully internally 
represented, deliverance of the sense organs. It trades upon the idea of 
simple inner state, without past or future trajectory. 
 
It may perhaps be useful to consider an analogy. When you encounter 
certain web pages, you may have a strong impression of richness. This 
impression is grounded in your perception of a screen rich in pointers 
to other sites, and your implicit knowledge that you can access those 
other sites with a simple flick of the mouse. Such a web page leaves us 




Following Kirsh (1991) I have argued elsewhere (Clark (1993)) that 
externally stored information which is poised for swift, easy and 
intelligent retrieval as-and-when needed should sometimes be 
regarded as already represented within the cognitive system. (It is this 
general commitment that leads, for example, to the ‘extended mind’ 
story found in Clark and Chalmers (1998)). The real-world scene, as 
O’Regan and others have pointed out, often meets this criterion, and 
should thus be regarded as a temporary, ever-changing module of 
external memory. The act of foveation-with-attention effectively 
moves information out of this module and into a kind of working 
memory buffer, making it available for the guidance of intentional 
and deliberate action (see Ballard et al (1997) on ‘deictic pointers’ for a 
worked out, experimentally-supported version of this kind of story). 
Indeed, as long ago as 1972 Newell and Simon commented that: 
 
From a functional viewpoint, the STM should be defined not as 
an internal memory but as the combination of (1) the internal 
STM and (2) the part of the visual display that is in the subject’s 
foveal view 
Newell and Simon, 1972, p. 
 
The feeling of visual richness, I want to suggest, is thus a bit like the 
feeling of ‘knowing a lot about pulp detective novels’. It is not that all 
that arcane knowledge is there all at once, actively co-present in 
conscious awareness. Rather, what is present is a kind of meta-
knowledge: the knowledge that you can retrieve just about any 
relevant bit of all that information as and when required, and deploy 
it in the service of your current conscious goals. Our conscious 
experience of visual richness, if this is at all on track, is an experience 
of a kind of problem-solving poise. 
 
All this, it seems to me, is correct and important. But the rather 
specific version of the skill-theory presented by O’Regan and Noe (In 
Press-2001) is more radical in at least two respects. First, because it 
depicts the skill theory as a direct dissolution of the ‘hard problem’ of 
visual qualia. Second, because it endorses (what I suspect to be) an 




My goal in the remainder of the paper will be to flesh out these 
worries, and to offer a weakened (regarding the ‘hard problem’) and 
amended (regarding the role of motor action) version of a skill-
theoretic account 
 
V. Sensorimotor Chauvinism and The Hard Problem 
 
O’Regan and Noe offer an unusually clear, and refreshingly ambitious 
story. The ‘hard problem’ of explaining visual qualia (what it is like to 
see red, why it is like anything at all to see red, etc) is, they suggest, 
simply unable to arise. And the explanatory gap thus feared between 
scientific accounts and the understanding of qualitative consciousness 
is no gap at all. The trouble arises, they suggest, only if we falsely 
believe that visual qualia are properties of experiential states. And this 
is (it is claimed) a theoretical mis-step since: 
 
Experiences…are not states. They are ways of acting. They are 
things we do…there are, in this sense at least, no (visual) 
qualia. Qualia are an illusion and the explanatory gap is no real 
gap at all. 




Dispelling the Grand Illusion illusion, it now seems, requires us to 
embrace an even greater oddity: the idea that qualia, properly 
speaking, do not exist! To sweeten the medicine, the authors use the 
familiar (ok, so mine’s a Ford) example of driving a Porsche. There is, 
they admit, ‘something that it is like to drive a Porsche’ But this 
“something it is like” does not consist in the occurrence of a special 
kind of internal representation (the kind supposedly accompanied by 
qualia). Rather it consists in “one’s comfortable exercise of one’s 
knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies governing the behaviour of 
the car” (Op cit., p.25). The driver knows, that is to say, how the car 
will corner, accelerate, and respond to braking, and much more 
besides. Most of this knowledge is non-propositional, more in the 
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realm of skilled know-how than reflective awareness. But knowing 
what it is like to drive a Porsche just is, the authors argue, having a 
bunch of such know-how. Similarly, knowing what it is like to see a 
red cube is simply knowing how the image of the cube will distort 
and alter as you move your eyes, how uneven illumination will affect 
the inputs, etc etc. In all these cases it is the fact that our knowledge is 
implicit, knowing-how not knowing-that, that makes it seem as if 
there is something ‘ineffable’ going on (op cit. p. 26). 
 
But this is not convincing. Consider a fairly simple Ping-Pong playing 
robotix: a descendent, perhaps, of the fairly successful prototype 
described in Andersson (1988). The robot uses multiple cameras, and 
it has an arm and a paddle. A modest on-line planning system plots 
initial paddle-to-ball trajectories, but this is soon improved during 
play and practice, as the system learns to use simpler visual cues to 
streamline and tune its behaviour. The robot, let us suppose, develops 
(courtesy of a neural network controller) a body of implicit knowledge 
of the relevant  sensorimotor contingencies. Finally, it is able to deploy 
this knowledge in the service of some simple goals, such as the goal of 
winning, but not by more than 3 points. At this moment, as far as I 
can tell, all of O’Regan and Noe’s conditions have been met: 
 
For a creature (or a machine for that matter) to possess visual 
awareness, what is required is that, in addition to exercising the 
mastery of the sensorimotor contingencies, it must make use of 
this exercise for the purposes of thought and planning. 
O’Regan and Noe (In Press-2001) p.7 
 
 
Assuming, then, that the term ‘thought’ is not here begging the 
question (by meaning something like ‘experience-accompanied 
reasoning’), the Ping-Pong robot is a locus of qualitative visual 
experience. But while a few philosophers might take a deep breath 
and agree, I suggest that the attribution of qualitative consciousness is 
fairly obviously out of place here.  O’Regan and Noe (2001) appeared 
to bite the bullet, by endorsing a kind of continuum view of 
qualitative consciousness, and allowing that this kind of robot would 
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indeed have some of it . In a footnote to the paper (note 7) they write 
that: 
 
Because we admit that awareness comes in degrees, we are 
willing to say that to the extent that  machines can plan and 
have rational behavior, precisely to that same extent they are 
also aware” (op cit, note 7, page 46) 
 
 
The question, I think,  is whether we should at this very early stage in 
the investigation of qualitative consciousness simply give up on the main 
intuitions that currently demarcate the very target of our theorising 
(intuitions such as: we have it, the Ping Pong Robot doesn’t, and we 
aren’t sure about a lot of animals).  In my view, the price of giving up 
these intuitions so soon is that we will never know when (or if) we 
have explained what we set out to. The pay-off (a very neat theory) is 
surely not worth this cost. Moreover we know, from our own 
experience, that visual information can guide apparently goal based 
activity while we are quite unaware of it doing so. Back in the 
Porsche, we may make a successful turn, to head for home, while fully 
engaged in some other task. Knowing just how much we ourselves 
can achieve with non-conscious sub-systems at the wheel, we are 
rightly suspicious of attributing too much too soon to the Ping Pong 
Robots of this world. 
 
In response to the Ping-Pong playing robot counter-example, 
O’Regan and Noe suggest that the robot described is “ far too simple 
to be a plausible candidate for perceptual consciousness of the kind 
usually attributed to animals or humans” (O’Regan and Noe (In-
Press B 2002) p.4). This simplicity is said to consist both in a lack of 
advanced sensorimotor skills and in the absence of a thick 
background of intentions, thoughts, concepts and language (op cit). 
Nonetheless, it still seems to me that the robot described meets the 
letter of the requirements laid out, and should (on their official 
account) be granted some small degree of conscious visual 
awareness- even if not ‘of the kind’ (though this is a somewhat vague 
and elusive notion) attributed to more complex beings 
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In addition, as Mark Rowlandsx has argued, even the general form of 
the attempted dissolution of the hard problem is suspect. First, since 
the hard problem arises for all varieties of phenomenal experience, it 
seems fair to ask how well the skill-based account will fare with the 
others? And for cases such as the feeling of depression, elation, pain 
etc it is not at all clear how it will work. Second, from the fact that a 
certain theoretical gloss on the hard problem is rejected, we cannot 
conclude that the problem itself has gone away. Thus we may agree 
that it is misleading to think of the hard problem as the problem of 
how certain internal representations come to generate qualitative 
experience. But it would not follow that the question, How is such 
experience possible?  is somehow mis-posed. Taking the full skill-
based story on board, the question can still be asked: Why is it like 
anything at all to see red, to drive a Porsche etc? 
 
The hard problem really has two components which need to be kept 
distinct. The first is: Why is such-and-such an experience like this 
rather than like that (why does Marmite taste like this and not like 
something else?). The second is: Why is it like anything at all? Many 
theories that get a purchase on the former fail to illuminate the latter, 
and the skill-theory belongs in this camp. The pattern of sensorimotor 
contingencies may help explain why experiences have the contents 
they do, but not why it is like anything at all to have them. 
(Conversely, accounts such as Clark (2000), which try to address the 
latter question, often fail to say anything about the former. We learn 
why it seems like something, but not why it seems the way it does!). 
 
From here on, I shall understand the skill-theory as an attempt to shed 
light on why certain experiences seem the way they do, rather than 
why they seem like anything at all. Even thus understood, the 
O’Regan and Noe proposal faces a rather important challenge. For the 
way the story is developed, it runs the risk (or so it seems to me) of a 
certain kind of over-sensitivity to low-level motoric variation. This kind of 
over-sensitivity I shall label ‘sensorimotor chauvinism’. Here’s what I 




It is an implication of the way O’Regan and Noe develop the skill 
theory that my conscious visual experience depends very very 
sensitively upon my implicit knowledge of a very specific set of 
sensorimotor contingencies, including those that they term 
‘apparatus-related’ i.e. relating to the body and sensory apparatus 
itself. Now certainly, they want to allow that what is broadly speaking 
visual experience could indeed be supported by many different kinds 
of sensing device, including TVSS arrays etc. It is the structure of the 
rules of sensorimotor contingency that matters, not the stuff. 
Nonetheless, it is equally clear that very small differences in the body 
and sensory apparatus will make a substantial difference to the 
precise set of sensorimotor contingencies that are implicitly known. 
And indeed, the authors are at pains to stress the importance of, for 
example, the precise way the sensory stimulation on the retina shifts 
and changes as we move our eyes (op cit. p.3), as helping to fix the 
pattern of sensorimotor contingencies. But of course it is (on their 
account) this very pattern that in turn determines the nature and 
content of our conscious visual experience. 
 
The suspicion I want to voice, then, is that this may make the contents 
of my visual experience too sensitive to the very precise, low-level 
details of sensory pick-up and apparatus. Suppose, for example, that 
my eyes saccade fractionally faster than yours. This will change the 
pattern of sensorimotor contingencies. But why should we believe 
that every such change in this pattern will yield a change, however 
minute, in the nature and contents of my conscious visual awareness? 
If we don’t believe this, then we will want to know what makes it the 
case that some changes in patterns of sensorimotor contingency impact 
conscious visual experience and some don’t. In sum, O’Regan and 
Noe must either accept that every difference makes a difference, or they 
owe us an account of which one’s matter and why. 
 
In response to this charge, O’Regan and Noe (In Press B 2001) 
embrace the idea that every difference makes a difference. Indeed, 




Allows for the judgement that creatures with radically different 
kinds of physical make-up can enjoy experience which is, to an 
important degree, the same in content and quality. But it also 
allows for the possibility (indeed the necessity) that where there are 
physical differences, there are also qualitative differences. 
O’Regan and Noe (2001, p.4. My emphasis) 
 
It is this latter consequence which I shall reject. The question what 
differences make a difference should, I believe, be an open empirical 
question. It should not be foreclosed by an overly enthusiastic 
development of the skill- theory. For skill theory, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Clark (1999), (In Press)) , has the resources to allow for 
many different kinds of way in which cognition may be “action-
oriented” and some of these leave plenty of room for loosening the 
ties between the full gamut of physical apparatus and the contents 
and character of conscious experience. 
 
Indeed, the resolution of this conundrum is hinted at by O’Regan and 
Noe’s own (very proper) insistence on the importance, for conscious 
vision, of linking currently exercised mastery of sensorimotor 
contingencies to planning, deliberation and intentional action. 
Mastery of the laws of sensorimotor contingency, O’Regan and Noe 
insist, must be ‘exercised for the purposes of thought and planning’ 
(op cit. p.7). But this very role, I shall next suggest, may act as a kind 
of filter on the type and level of detail (of mastery of sensorimotor 
contingencies) that matters for the determination of the contents of 
conscious visual experience. 
 
VI. Reason, Action and Experience 
 
 
Here’s where we seem to be. We began with the idea that our visual 
experience may not be all it seems: that we may be misled into 
thinking we see more, and are sensitive to more changes, than we 
actually are. Careful examination suggests, however, that what is 
really at fault is a certain theoretical model of that in which conscious 
seeing consists. If conscious seeing were forced to consist in the 
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internal tokening, moment-by-moment, of a constantly updated 
model of the scene, then we would indeed be wildly misled by our 
experiences of visual richness. For our persisting internal 
representations, such as they are, appear to be sparse and high-level, 
supplemented by more detailed information retrieved at the last 
possible moment, and kept only for the duration of the appropriate 
element of the task.  
 
The skill-theoretic approach offers an alternative theoretical model, 
relative to which our error is much less dramatic. By highlighting the 
way temporally extended information-seeking activity actually 
constitutes successful contact with a rich and detailed external scene, 
skill theory dispels the miasma of Grand Illusion. Our visual 
experience reflects our successful engagement with the richness of the 
scene. O’Regan and Noe’s marvellously detailed development of the 
skill-theoretic line threatens, however, to tie conscious visual 
experience too closely to the precise details of the low-level 
sensorimotor routines by means of which this engagement proceeds. 
Yet the resources are all there to support a slightly different kind of 
skill-theoretic story. For O’Regan and Noe also insist, importantly, on 
the profound connection between conscious visual experience and 
intentional action: the kinds of action we would describe as 
‘deliberate’ and as emanating from the conscious endorsement of 
reasons and plans. Proper attention to this dimension suggests a 
slightly different way to develop and deploy the skill-theoretic 
intuitions. 
 
We can creep up on this by highlighting a second way in which we 
might perhaps be accused of misunderstanding the nature and role of 
our own conscious visual experience. This is by making what I call 
(Clark, In Press) the Assumption of Experience-Based Control: 
 
(Assumption of Experience-Based Control. EBC.) 
 
The details of our conscious visual experience are what guide 





We often relax this assumption when reflecting upon, for example, 
our experiences of playing sports etc. At such moments we realise that 
there is really no way our conscious visual experience is fine-tuning 
our actions. But we seem to believe, for the most part, that our 
conscious seeings are usually guiding and controlling our visually-
based activities. To see ourselves aright, then, it is important to be 
very clear about the precise sense of control and guidance that is most 
likely actually at work. 
 
Taken at face value, the assumption of experience based control is 
increasingly suspect. Thus consider Milner and Goodale’s provocative 
claim that “what we think we ‘see’ is not what guides our actions” 
(Milner and Goodale 1995 p.177). The idea, which will be familiar to 
many readers, is that online visually guided action is supported by 
neural resources that are fundamentally distinct from, and at least 
quasi-independent of, those that support conscious visual experience, 
off-line imagistic reasoning, and visual categorisation and planning. 
More specifically, the claim is that the human cognitive architecture 
includes two fairly distinct ‘visual brains’. One, the more ancient, is 
specialised for the visually-based control of here-and-now fine motor 
action. The other, more recent, is dedicated to the explicit-knowledge-
and-memory based selection of deliberate and planned actions (what 
Milner and Goodale (1998, p.4) nicely describe as ‘insight, hindsight 
and foresight about the visual world’). The former is then identified 
with the dorsal visual-processing stream leading to the posterior 
parietal lobule, and the latter with the ventral stream projecting to 
inferotemporal cortex. 
 
Computationally, some such division of labour makes good sense. 
The fine-grained control of action (the precise details of the visually-
guided reach for the coffee-cup etc) requires rapidly processed, 
constantly updated, egocentrically specified information about form, 
orientation, distance etc. Conceptual thought (the identification of 
objects and the selection of deliberate actions) requires the 
identification of objects and situations according to category and 
significance, quite irrespective of the precise details of retinal image 
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size etc. Achieving a computationally efficient coding for either of 
these pretty much precludes the use of that very same coding for the 
other. In each case, as Milner and Goodale note, we need to extract, 
filter, and throw away different aspects of the signal, and to perform 
very different kinds of operation and transformation. 
 
Concrete evidence in support of the dual visual systems view comes 
in three main forms. First, single cell recordings that show the 
different response characteristics of cells in the two streams. For 
example, PP (posterior parietal) neurons that respond maximally to 
combinations of visual cues and motor actions, and IT 
(inferotemporal) neurons that prefer complex object-centred features 
independently of location in egocentric space (see e.g. Milner and 
Goodale (1995) p.63).  
 
Second, there are the various pathologies. The most famous example 
is DF, a ventrally-compromised patient who claims she has no 
conscious visual experience of the shape and orientation of objects but 
who can nonetheless perform quite fluent motor actions (such as pre-
orienting and posting a letter through a visually presented slot). 
Importantly, DF fails to perform well if a time delay is introduced 
between presentation of the slot and selection (with the slot now out 
of sight) of an orientation. This presumably shifts the burden from the 
intact, putatively non-conscious dorsal stream to the impaired ventral 
resource dedicated to memory, planning and deliberate action 
selection. Optic ataxics, conversely, are dorsally impaired and claim to 
see the objects perfectly well despite being unable to engage them by 
fluent behaviours. These patients are actually helped by the 
introduction of a short time delay. 
 
Third, there is some (controversial) evidence from normal subjects. 
Certain visual illusionsxi, for example, seem to affect our conscious 
perceptions without impairing our ongoing visuomotor motions. In 
these cases, Milner and Goodale suggest, the non-conscious dorsal 
stream controls the fine-tuned motions and is immune to the illusion, 
which arises due to processing idiosyncrasies in the ventral stream. 
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(And in these cases, likewise, introduction of a time-delay blocks the 
accurate performance). 
 
Milner and Goodale end their account with a model of how the two 
visual brains interact. The interaction, they suggest, occurs precisely at 
the level of intentional agency. Conscious visual experience can select 
the targets of actions, and the types of action to be performed. For 
example, conscious vision is used to select the red cup on the left and 
to decide on a grip appropriate to throwing rather than drinking. But 
it is then left to the non-conscious dorsal stream to work out how to 
implement these plans and ideas. 
 
Milner and Goodale, it is reasonable to suspect (and see Clark (1999) 
(In Press) for some details), overplay the extent to which the two 
streams work in near-isolation. For example, Pascual-Leone and 
Walsh (2001), in an elegant application of TMS (transcranial magnetic 
stimulation) show that feedback from high-to-low level visual areas 
(from V5/MT to V1 and V2) is necessary for certain kinds of conscious 
visual perception. This opens up the intriguing possibility that 
upstream activity of many kinds could directly modify conscious 
visual awareness by altering activity at the common gateway to both 
streams. And there are, without doubt, many complex and iterated 
interactions which compromise the isolationist integrity of the two 
streams. Moreover, there is a convincing case to be made that the 
degree of stream-independence, and (conversely) the nature and 
extent of stream interaction, is both task and attention dependent (see 
Brennar and Smeets (1996), Jeannerod (1997) Decety and Grezes 
(1999), Rensink (2000), Carey (2001) and discussion in Clark (In 
Press)). 
 
A weakened version of the dual visual systems hypothesis, however, 
enjoys widespread support (e.g. Jeannerod (1997), Decety and Grezes 
(1999)). Such accounts accept the task-variability of the inter-stream 
relationship, and leave room for complex feedback modulated 
interactions, but they preserve the essential insight, which is that 
substantial amounts of fine-action-guiding visual processing are often 
carried out independently of the processing underlying conscious 
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visual awareness. Such accounts accept that when we keep looking 
while performing a task, we are indeed feeding two sets of (partially 
interacting) processes: one more ancient, concerned with fine 
visuomotor action in the here-and-now, the other more recent, and 
geared towards reasoning and conscious awareness. It is the latter 
system, geared towards spotting the meaningful in a way fit for 
reasoned action-selection, that is also most closely associated with 
semantic and episodic memory systems.  
 
Consider, to take just one more example, a series of experiments in 
which subjects were required to both visually track and manually 
point out a visually presented target. This target, however, was 
sometimes suddenly (unexpectedly) slightly displaced after the 
original presentation. Bridgeman et al (1979) showed that subjects 
would accommodate this displacement (as evidenced by accurate 
saccades and pointing) whilst remaining quite unaware that the target 
had moved. Moreover, in those cases where the displacement was 
large enough to attract attention and hence to enter conscious 
awareness, the on-line adjustments were much less fluid and less 
successful (for a rehearsal, see Milner and Goodale, 1995, 161).  
 
To round this story off, Wong and Mack (1981) showed that subjects 
who automatically and unconsciously accommodate the smaller 
displacements will, if subsequently asked to point to the remembered 
location of the (now-removed) target, actually point to the original 
(non-displaced) location. Similar results have been obtained for 
grasping motions directed at present versus remembered visually 
displayed objects (see Milner and Goodale 1995, 170-173). Memory-
driven responses thus seem to be tied to the contents of conscious 
visual experience, while on-line object-engaging performance is 
driven by a distinct and more sensitive resource. 
 
The Assumption of Experience-Based Control thus needs to handled 
with extreme care. Our conscious visual experiences certainly impact 
our choices of actions. But they do not do so by virtue of providing 
the visual information that is itself used for the fine-tuned control of 
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movement. Clark (In Press) suggests that the EBC should thus be 
replaced by something like this: 
 
Hypothesis of Experience-based Selection (EBS) 
 
Conscious visual experience presents the world to a subject in a 




In all the cases we have discussed, the alignment of certain memory-
systems with conscious visual experience looks robust and significant. 
This simple fact leads to the final idea that I want to consider. It is the 
idea that, contrary to the most radical versions of the skill theory: 
 
The key to connecting consciousness with action might involve 
memory systems rather than motor systems 
Prinz (2000) p.252 
 
Prinz’ speculation is that the evolution of new episodic and working 
memory systems fundamentally altered- for certain organisms-the 
relation between perception and action. Phylogenetically more ancient 
structures could already support the rapid, input-driven selection of 
innate and learnt motor responses, and could initiate whole cycles of 
environmental probing in which sensing and acting are deeply 
interanimated. But in some animals new working memory systems 
began to support the retention and off-line manipulation of perceptual 
information. Episodic memory systems allowed them “to encode 
particular perceptual events in a long-term store and to access those 
events on future occasions” (op cit. p.253). These explicit memories 
could be called up even when the circumstances to which they were 
initially keyed were no longer present, and put into contact with 
systems for planning (real planning, in which multiple stages of action 
are considered, chained together, and assessed) and reasoned action-
selection. The emergence of these new reason-and-memory-based 
systems marked, Prinz speculates, the emergence of consciousness 
itself. In a similar veinxii Hardcastle (1995), following an extensive 
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review of the neuroscientific and psychological literature, suggests 
that: 
 
Conscious perceptions and thoughts just are activations in SE 
[semantic, ‘explicit controlled access’] memory 
Hardcastle 1995 p.101 
 
One way or another, then, the links between special kinds of memory 
systems and conscious experience seem strong. Conscious experience 
is, above all, the base for reasoned, deliberate action selection. And 
this requires deep and abiding links with the special memory systems 
that mediate between sensory input and action. 
 
I should add one important caveat. In speaking of the importance of 
explicit memory structures, I make no commitment to any specific 
story about encoding or storage. In particular, it seems highly unlikely 
that such encodings are in any interesting sense propositional. 
Instead, the stored information is most likely geared quite tightly to 
the kinds of action we may need to select, and to the environmental 
resources upon which we may reasonably rely. 
 
With this in mind, let us finally revisit the rather strong form of the 
skill-theory as advanced in O’Regan and Noe (2001) . Here, 
knowledge of a specific set of potential movements and their results is 
said to constitute a given visual perception (Op Cit p.13). The general 
idea is that knowledge of the laws of sensorimotor contingency 
actually constitutes the way the brain codes for visual features and 
attributes. This idea is economical, elegant and attractive. But in the 
specific case of conscious visual perception, the work on the dual 
visual systems hypothesis suggests an alternative unpacking. For 
what matters, as far as conscious seeing is concerned, is that the 
object/event is ‘one of those’ (ie falls into such-and-such a class or 
category) and that a certain range of actions (not movements, but 
actions such as grasping-to-throw, grasping-to-drink, etc) is 
potentially available. Both ‘visual brains’, I am suggesting, represent 
by activating implicit knowledge of some set of possible actions and 
results. In the case of the ‘visuomotor brain’ these are indeed pitched 
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at the kind of level O’Regan and Noe seem to favour: they will 
concern e.g. the anticipated distortions of the retinal image in 
response to certain head and eye motions etc. But in the case of the 
‘conscious visual brain’ they are more likely to concern types of action 
and their effects as applied to types of objects eg the way ‘throwing 
the cup at the wall’ gives way to ‘smashed cup on the floor’ and so on. 
These kinds of sparse, high-level understanding are, of course, 
precisely the kinds of understanding that do seem to underpin our 
conscious visual experience, as the various change blindness results 
(and the card tricks) help to show.  
 
One way to dramatise this idea is to exploit the idea (Goodale (1998)) 
that conscious seeing acts in a way somewhat reminiscent of the 
interaction between a human operator and a smart teleassistance 
device.  The operator decides on the target and action-type (for 
example “pick up the blue rock on the far left”) and the robot uses its 
own sensing and acting routines to do the rest.  Knowledge of our 
capacity to engage such routines may, on the present account, be 
essential to the content of the experience, even if the routines 
themselves employ sensory inputs in a very different, and largely 
independent, way. 
 
O’Regan and Noe claimed, recall, that 
 
For a creature to possess visual awareness, what is 
required is that, in addition to exercising the mastery of 
the relevant sensorimotor contingencies, it must make use 
of this exercise for the purposes of thought and planning 
 
Op Cit p 7 My emphasis 
 
But what exactly does this mean? Imagine again a tele-assistance set-
up in which the distant robot has implicit mastery of the SMC for, 
say, reaching and grabbing.This will only matter, as far as the 
conscious controller is concerned, in a functional way: the controller 
needs to know what the robot can and can’t do (it can’t fly, it can 
reach, it can grab gently or harder, etc). The SMC knowledge that the 
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robot depends upon could be quite different, in detail, as long as the broad 
functionality was the same.  
 
What matters for conscious vision, on this alternative model, is that 
the visually seen object is recognised as belonging to some class, and 
as affording certain types of action. The bodies of know-how that 
count here concern objects and events at this level of description. 
Insofar as the lower-level SMC’s matter here, they do so non-
constitutively. Sameness of visual experience thus depends on 
sameness of what might be called ‘intentional role’ rather than 
sameness of all the SMCs. 
 
At best, then, there is an unclarity hereabouts in O’Regan and Noe’s 
account. The skill-theoretic response to the Grand Illusion story is, I 
think, the right one. But it needs to take two forms to deal with the 
full gamut of ways the brain uses visual information. One of those 
ways is geared to the fine control of here-and-now visuomotor action, 
and the relevant laws of sensorimotor contingency here do indeed 
concern the very precise- and fully apparatus dependent- ways that 
the eyes are stimulated in response to various kinds of motion and 
probing. The other is geared to the selection of actions (not motions) 
and to planning and reasoning, and the relevant implicit knowledge 
here takes a different and more ‘meaningful’ form: it is knowledge of 
what we can do and achieve on the basis of current visual input, 
knowledge of a space of actions and results, rather than of a space of 
movements and subsequent inputsxiii.  
 
I would be the last to downplay the significance, in human cognition, 
of tightly coupled, embodied, embedded sensorimotor loops (see 
Clark 1997). But these loops, in the case of humans and (I expect) 
other higher animals are now themselves intertwined with new 
circuitry geared towards knowing, recall and reasoning. 
Understanding both the intimacies and the estrangements that obtain 
between these recently coiled cognitive serpents is, I suggest, one of 
the most important tasks facing contemporary cognitive science.  
 




The skill theory, as developed by O’Regan and Noe, ties conscious 
visual experience rather too closely (I have argued) to the precise 
details of our sensory engagements with the world. If (say) my eyes 
saccade just a little faster than yours, this may have no impact upon 
the qualitative nature of my visual experience. For conscious vision is 
geared to presenting the world for reason and for quite high-level 
action selection. This requires converging on-the-spot visual input 
(gathered just-in-time, and as dictated by the task and the allocation of 
attention) with stored memories and expectations. What matters for 
visual consciousness is thus (I suggest) at best a select subset of the 
information O’Regan and Noe highlight. The full detail of the 
sensorimotor contingencies that characterise my visual contact with 
specific objects and events is unlikely to matter. What will matter are 
whatever (perhaps quite high-level) aspects of those sensorimotor 
contingencies prove most useful for reason, recognition and planning. 
If this is correct, it is a mistake to tie visual experience too tightly to 
the invariants that guide and characterise visuomotor action.  
 
Where the skill theory scores, however, is in recognising that 
conscious perceptual experience need not (and should not) be 
identified with a single time-slice of an environmentally isolated 
system. Instead, we need to consider the way temporally extended 
sequences of exploratory actions, and our knowledge of the 
availability and likely deliverances of such exploratory routines, may 
actually help constitute the contents of my perceptual experience. And 
this, in turn, requires recognising the way the external scene may itself 
feature as a kind of temporary memory resource, able to be accessed 
and deployed as and when the task requires.  
 
As for the Grand Illusion, that really was a trick of the light. For once 
we take all this into account, our visual experience is not itself 
misleading. The scene before us is indeed rich in colour, depth and 
detail, just as we take it to be. And we have access to this depth and 
detail as easily as we have access to facts stored in biological long-
term memory. It is just that in the case of the visual scene, retrieval is 
via visual saccade and exploratory action. Our daily experience only 
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becomes misleading in the context of a host of unwise theoretical 
moves and commitments: commitments concerning the precise role of 
internal representations in supporting visual experience, as well as 
our pervasive neglect of the cognitive role of temporally extended 
processes and active exploration.  
 
A full account of conscious seeing cannot, however, stop there. For the 
world is seen, via these exploratory engagements, in a way that 
continuously converges selective input sampling with stored 
knowledge, memories and expectations. The contents of conscious 
visual experience emerge at this complex intersection. What we 
consciously see is a world tailor-made for thought, reason and 
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i  http://members.tripod.com/~andybauch/magic.html. Or just feed ‘amazing card trick’ to a 
search engine such as Google. 
ii Recall Dennett’s ‘many Marilyns’ example, as described in Dennett 1991 
iii To my knowledge, the phrase Grand Illusion was first used in Noe, Pessoa and Thompson 
(2000), which was a critique of the idea that visual experience involved any such illusion. 




v Yarbus (1967). 
vi McConkie, G. (1990), O’Regan (1990). And see discussion in Churchland et al (1994) 
vii McConkie (1990), O’Regan (1992). 
viii The original experiment was done by Neisser (1979). Recent versions, including the opaque 
case, are due to Simons and Chabris (1999). 
ix This example is from Clark and Toribio (In-Press, 2001) 
x See the draft paper “Two Dogmas of Consciousness” on his web page at: 
www.ucc.ie/ucc/depts/phil/
 
xi  E.g. the Tichener Circles illusion discussed in Milner and Goodale (1995) Ch. 6 – see Clark (In 
Press) for an extended discussion of this case 
xii The accounts are by no means identical. Prinz emphasizes akind of informational poise at the 
gateways to the memory systems, whereas Hardcastle emphasizes activity in the memory 
systems themselves. See especially Prinz (2000) p.255 
 
xiii For a little more on this, see Clark (1999) section 3 “two ways to be action-oriented”. 
 37
